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John: > And Rosta scripsit: > > > Because Kinds (and properties) exist by virtue of abstract definition, > > not by virtue of the contingent facts of the local world. > > This gets into fuggly issues of essentialism, particularly the attempt > to distinguish between essential and contingent properties. Yes. The distinction is difficult, but it necessarily exists, if definitions do. > > > They are swans all right. The question is whether it would be wrong to > > > deny that Mr. Bluebird is a subkind of Mr. Blanu merely because some > > > non-blue bluebirds might be discovered eventually. > > > > I think it would definitely be wrong. Must a bluebird be blue? No. > > How do you know that? I don't take colour to be a species-defining property. It may be a hallmark, but not a defining property. You may disagree, and zoologists may correct me, in which case I might change my beliefs about bluebirdhood. > > -- According to my definitions of bluebirdhood. > > So Kind is subjective? Precisely as subjective as every predicate. In using a predicate, I cannot escape using my own beliefs about what its definition is. --And.