[YG Conlang Archives] > [jboske group] > messages [Date Index] [Thread Index] >
Nick:
> cu'u la .and
>
> >Kinds involve a fundamentally different ontology from ordinary
> >predicate logic:
>
> >i. To every property there corresponds one Kind. (I'm not sure
> >whether relations also have corresponding Kinds.) A Kind is
> >the embodiment of the property
> >ii. Every x can be construed as a Kind corresponding to property
> >{me x}
>
> .... every which x? As in, the cat Mr Frisky can be construed as a
> Kind corresponding to the haeccity (or whatever) Mr Friskyhood?
Yes.
> Well, maybe so, but what does that buy us?
An ontology that gives us what we were looking for.
> >iii. All kinds exist
>
> If you can get away with this, then this is indeed the solution to
> intensionality. *If* you can get away with this
Since all properties exist, it is not too difficult to take one
step further to an ontology where their corresponding Kinds exist.
> >iv. A Kind exists in more than one world
>
> As I'm finding in my remedial reading of Montague For Dummies, the
> problem of what exists in what world is very very thorny, and Monty
> following Dana Scott dodged it by having the pool of X range across
> all worlds, without pausing to wonder whether X belonged in world A
> or B. Intuitively (and I know intuition is evil in formalism, but
> still), if we have two worlds, one in which I eat an apple and the
> other in which I eat an orange, it is perverse to say those aren't
> the same individual. So I don't like even posing the issue of what
> exists in what world
For things like cats and apples, if da plise/mlatu, then, IMO, da
is a piece of a single world, pisu'oloi -world (a spacetime). I take
that as part of the meaning of plise and mlatu. I further think that
spacetimes don't overlap, so a piece of one is not a piece of another.
But things like "da -number" and "da ka" don't require da to be a piece
of a single world -- da is not a piece of spacetime. And the same goes
for Kinds.
> >v. One Kind can be a kind-of another
>
> >For property P, the corresponding Kind could be defined thus:
>
> >x such that for every y, if P(y) then y is a kind of x
>
> So if P is 'blue' and y are all individual blue things, then y's are
> avatars of the Kind Blue
Yes.
> >and if y is a kind of x then either P(y) or for me'i ro
> >z such that P(z), z is a kind of y
>
> If y is an avatar of Bluedom, then either it is actually blue, or it
> itself contains different kinds of things, most of which are actually
> blue?
The idea is that the kinds of Mr Dog include not only Mr Fido but
also Mr Poodle.
> >A. One Kind o-gadri:
> >lo-kind broda = lo-kind cmima be lo'i broda
> >lo-kind cmima be le'i broda
> >lo-kind cmima be la'i broda
>
> >B. One Kind gadrow:
> >lo-kind broda
> >le-kind broda
> >la-kind broda
>
> >C. One Kind LAhE:
> >LAhE-kind lo'i broda
> >LAhE-kind le'i broda
> >LAhE-kind la'i broda
>
> I believe C is least disruptive, but would not object to B
>
> >In AL, I follow xorxes in opining that lo/le/la when not preceded
> >by an explicit PA should mean lo/le/la-kind. This solution seems
> >so overwhelming superior to A/B/C that the BF ought to consider
> >it
>
> And it so overwhelmingly breaks with the existing understanding of
> {lo broda = pa lo selci be loi broda} that I will vote against it
*Is* that the existing understanding of {lo broda}? I'm not sure it
is. But anyway, I don't want to rehash the discussion about
fundamentalism we've just had. All I was thinking was that the
BF ought to at least be given the chance to consider elegant
revisionist solutions, if it is to be given a chance to make
SL palatable enough to prevent defection to AL.
> >As for "is a kind of", this can either be a selbri (typically
> >taking as x2 a sumti of type A/B/C), or a NU working like
> >{poi'i}, or (by stipulation) LE + ro + A/B/C
>
> The least disruoptive and most intuitive, I take it, would be a
> selbri. Is klesi that selbri?
Not quite, because klesi (e.g. "da klesi de") doesn't guarantee that
x1 and x2 are Kinds. But some lujvo involving klesi would do.
--And.