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cu'u la .and.
Kinds involve a fundamentally different ontology from ordinary predicate logic:
i. To every property there corresponds one Kind. (I'm not sure
whether relations also have corresponding Kinds.) A Kind is
the embodiment of the property.
ii. Every x can be construed as a Kind corresponding to property
{me x}.
... every which x? As in, the cat Mr Frisky can be construed as a Kind corresponding to the haeccity (or whatever) Mr Friskyhood? Well, maybe so, but what does that buy us?
iii. All kinds exist.
If you can get away with this, then this is indeed the solution to intensionality. *If* you can get away with this.
iv. A Kind exists in more than one world.
As I'm finding in my remedial reading of Montague For Dummies, the problem of what exists in what world is very very thorny, and Monty following Dana Scott dodged it by having the pool of X range across all worlds, without pausing to wonder whether X belonged in world A or B. Intuitively (and I know intuition is evil in formalism, but still), if we have two worlds, one in which I eat an apple and the other in which I eat an orange, it is perverse to say those aren't the same individual. So I don't like even posing the issue of what exists in what world.
v. One Kind can be a kind-of another.
For property P, the corresponding Kind could be defined thus:
x such that for every y, if P(y) then y is a kind of x
So if P is 'blue' and y are all individual blue things, then y's are avatars of the Kind Blue.
and if y is a kind of x then either P(y) or for me'i ro z such that P(z), z is a kind of y.
If y is an avatar of Bluedom, then either it is actually blue, or it itself contains different kinds of things, most of which are actually blue?
A. One Kind o-gadri: lo-kind broda = lo-kind cmima be lo'i broda lo-kind cmima be le'i broda lo-kind cmima be la'i broda
B. One Kind gadrow: lo-kind broda le-kind broda la-kind broda
C. One Kind LAhE: LAhE-kind lo'i broda LAhE-kind le'i broda LAhE-kind la'i broda
I believe C is least disruptive, but would not object to B.
In AL, I follow xorxes in opining that lo/le/la when not preceded by an explicit PA should mean lo/le/la-kind. This solution seems so overwhelming superior to A/B/C that the BF ought to consider it.
And it so overwhelmingly breaks with the existing understanding of {lo broda = pa lo selci be loi broda} that I will vote against it.
As for "is a kind of", this can either be a selbri (typically
taking as x2 a sumti of type A/B/C), or a NU working like
{poi'i}, or (by stipulation) LE + ro + A/B/C.
The least disruoptive and most intuitive, I take it, would be a selbri. Is klesi that selbri?
-- **** **** **** **** **** **** **** **** **** **** **** **** **** **** **** * Dr Nick Nicholas, French & Italian Studies nickn@hidden.email * University of Melbourne, Australia http://www.opoudjis.net * "Eschewing obfuscatory verbosity of locutional rendering, the * circumscriptional appelations are excised." --- W. Mann & S. Thompson, * _Rhetorical Structure Theory: A Theory of Text Organisation_, 1987. * **** **** **** **** **** **** **** **** **** **** **** **** **** **** ****