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John: > Nick Nicholas scripsit: > > > ... every which x? As in, the cat Mr Frisky can be construed as a > > Kind corresponding to the haeccity (or whatever) Mr Friskyhood? Well, > > maybe so, but what does that buy us? > > I agree: properties in the first place are projections of classes > (the property of being red is just a reification of the class of red > things), so reducing properties back to classes doesn't help But that is only one possible ontology. In another possibility, properties are primitive and classes are derivative. And in that case, Kinds, notional embodiments of properties, do help. You are not obliged to embrace this ontology, and propositionalism allows you to eschew all mention of Kinds. That is, you can escape intensionality if you choose. > > >iii. All kinds exist > > > > If you can get away with this, then this is indeed the solution to > > intensionality. *If* you can get away with this > > That's what's sticky. There are no unicorns, and there are no > purple (by nature) rhinos, but there is only one null set > Likewise, having a heart does not equal having a kidney, but the set of > heart-havers turns out to be the same as the set of kidney-havers Obviously you are taking an extensionalist view. Basically you are saying "My preferred ontology is incompatible with intensionalism" -- which is fair enough, so long as you don't insist on Lojban being able to express no ontology but your preferred one. --And.