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Re: [engelang] Xorban Terminology






From: John E Clifford <kali9putra@hidden.email>
To: "engelang@yahoogroups.com" <engelang@yahoogroups.com>
Sent: Thursday, September 27, 2012 3:33 PM
Subject: Re: [engelang] Xorban Terminology

 



From: Mike S. <maikxlx@gmail.com>
To: engelang@yahoogroups.com
Sent: Thursday, September 27, 2012 1:43 PM
Subject: Re: [engelang] Xorban Terminology

 
On Thu, Sep 27, 2012 at 12:51 PM, John E Clifford <kali9putra@hidden.email> wrote: 
Now I see why I am having problems.  Lumping all these things together as nary operators misses crucial distinctions among them, it seems to me.  It is still not clear to me, for example, whether d is more like l or m.  I think it is the latter, but the classification leaves that open.  By the way, the discussion around d, though brief, suggests that its F is not veridical, that is daFa does not require that a be an F.  In the case of f, the usage suggests that the context is intensional, that the formula refers across worlds (or is a function that does), but classification makes no note of that.

They're only lumped together syntactically.  Semantically they're split by their separate meanings.  Unary "m-" can be thought of as an operator that takes an arbitrary, possibly bizarre or undefined formula, interprets it formally as a mere phonological entity, and treats it as the equivalent of a Lojban cmene.  The difference from Lojban is that it provides an argument place so that it can serve as a predication.  Thus it's possible to say things like "la grka ma rkse" = "The dog is called Rex".  Note that "rks" need not be a defined predicate and "e" need not be bound, because the putative internal semantics of a formula under the scope of "m-" need not be taken in consideration in order for "ma F" to have a meaning.  Presumably, in the case of "la grka ma crba" = "The dog is called Bear", we could choose "a" for "crb" in order to invoke the characteristics of a bear, thereby invoking a less arcanely meaningful name (as opposed to "Rex"), but the apparent "binding" of "a" in this case would be only suggestive, not formal. 

rks may not be a defined predicate, but it has the form of a predicate and, apparently, has an argument slot, so rksa is a formula and in la grka ma rksa, a is therefore bound by the l.  (Oh, and the name comes out as "ruckus")  I had understood m to be a predicate makers, taking a bare phonetic form (so presumably in quotes of some sort) , a returning a predicate "is called N".  Namaing, of course, does not usually imply uniqueness in a strict sense, only in context, so that whole groups or nations or whatever get names which apply to them individually as well as collectively.  l definiteness is contextual, but presumably works with names like rks.

As far as how "m" and "d" interact:  I don't know if "m" was intended to entail definiteness, though pragmatically at least that could be the usual interpretation.  That entailment is certainly not necessary though; plenty of natlangs incl Portuguese and ancient Greek generally require the definite article with proper names; others like French only sometimes e.g. "la France".  If Xorban followed this latter logic, then in order to be fully clear we might be forced to say "la da ma rkse se mlte vskake" for "[the definite entity called] Rex sees a cat", unless "l-" does the magic of "d-" for us.   Which brings us to:

As far as how "d" and "l" overlap:  I will save that for another time, because I am not sure there is any real difference.  Or at least, the difference is not easy to describe.  Perhaps it's that "d-" excludes generic readings, and "l-" does not. 

Now I am at a loss.  l clearly binds a variable; does d?  I was taking d to be just a variant of m, using real predicates and applying them to selected objects, but without insisting that they fit.  So, da crba is a formula that says that "a is being said to be bears, but don't count on it -- you know what I mean", very like le in Lojban, in fact (which is about the only reason I can think of to have it). 

As far as "f-" and intensionality, IMO intensionality should be something defined in predicate places, not something marked on the object/sumti or binders/gadri.  IMO I should be able to say "le fe lmna'a nlca'ake" = "I like to swim (intension)" and "le je tje fe lmna'a [hika] plkeka'a" = "I am [now] enjoying this swim (extensional)" without marking the object for intensionality because the predicate should be defined such as to indicate it.   Same as "le ckle nlca'ake" = "I like chocolate (intensional)" vs. "le cke [hika] plkeka'a" = "I am [currently] enjoying chocolate (extensional)".

No solution to questions of intensionality is going to be perfectly tidy, but this seems more messy than usual.  I don't see why nlc2 should be intensional nor why a sentence like "I like chocolate"  or "I like to swim" requires it to be (I would think that both of those require event arguments, however).  And similarly (to the opposite effect) for plk2.  I am not quite sure what h is about -- it wasn't on the list the last time I checked, but that has been a while.  & had it for "is the haeceity of", which doesn't fit here, free variable or not.   But to the cases: If there are not events of swimming that I like when engaging in them -- indeed, if I have never engaged in such -- then the claim that I like swimming is just false.  So, binding in applies and the whole is not intensional.  I do wonder whether nlc and plk are as closely related as this paragraph suggests and, if so, why we have both of them.  Unless, of course, we are to get our predicates in pairs, an intensional one and an extensional one -- but, in that case, I would hope that the relation and the difference would be overtly marked. 


After some further looking, I notice first that you have both the supposedly intensional  and the supposedly extensional formulae written with extensional quantification  (which seems to me to be correct in all four cases).  The second thing is that you seem to equate (or at least subsume) intensionality to "not happening now", which would make most conversations mainly intensional.  Intensionality is not time-bound, or even reality-bound, but inside-the-head-bound, bound up with meaning, not with things.  I like Sherlock Holmes, even when I am not enjoying him (indeed, I like him rather more than I enjoy him) but neither takes me to intentions that I can see.  Even wanting Sherlock Holmes doesn't, any more than wanting my mother (dead some quarter century) does.  But believing that Sherlock Holmes is smarter than Moriarty may get me into trouble (or may not). 
--
co ma'a mke

Xorban blog: Xorban.wordpress.com
My LL blog: Loglang.wordpress.com