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On 9/19/06, John E. Clifford <clifford-j@hidden.email> wrote:
--- In jboske@yahoogroups.com, "Jorge Llambías" <jjllambias@...> wrote: How so? Tjhe question is whether a particular move is valid.
The move in question, I take it, is from "Fa" to "ExFx".
That move is always valid, as far as I'm concerned.
The move from "Fa" to "Ex(Zx&Fx)" (where Z is the predicate {zasti})
is not a move of logic, and does not always work.
In the restricted domain where AxZx is true (the "real world" domain),
the move from "Fa" to "Ex(Zx&Fx)" will work. When using such a
restricted domain we won't be able to refer to things that don't exist,
obviously, since they won't be in the domain.
Showing ther is a domain in which it does not work (true premises, false conclusion) is enough to show that it is not valid.
There is no domain in which the move does not work, as far as I can see.
When doing an interpretation, we first we have to figure out what is in
the domain of discourse. This is a metalinguistic process (in the object
language, everything is in the universe of discourse, by definition,
so there is nothing to figure out in that respect.) Every referring term
contributes its referent(s) to the domain of discourse. If we fail to assign
a referent to a referring term, we must resort to the metalinguistic {ki'a}.
We must step out of the discourse, as it were, and clarify the language,
because the discourse is not working as it should.
> > We say that two things are identical when we refer to the same object > > using expressions that have different sense. > > Why do you say "two things" then? Can two things be one and > the same object? We tend to say there are two things when we mean there are two denoting expressions. I think I said it carefully at least once, but that is tedious and hardly anyone who is a cooperative conversationalist misunderstands the other expression.
I agree it's easy to understand. I'm not convinced that the theory that says that this way of speaking is just sloppy usage is better than the theory that says that this way of speaking is perfectly justifiable uage.
> Have you read <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity-relative/>? > Yeah. It didn't help since you seem to have reproduced its way of talking fairly accurately and it is that way of talking that does not make sense.
To me it makes pretty good sense. It is in fact the only account of the "paradoxes of identity" that I have found satisfying. Is there any particular part that does not make sense to you?
> > > Suppose Superman/Clark comes to you and asks: > > > > > > Does Lois want me to kiss her?
[...]
> does his question have any possible yes/no answer at all? Sure, especially if he asks in one guise or the other.
Right, so the referent (or the sense?) of {mi} will vary depending
on his guise. I think good answers in such case would be:
Yes, but she doesn't want Clark to kiss her.
No, but she does want Superman to kiss her.
so as to make clear to Superman/Clark that his "me" must be interpreted
in accordance with his current guise.
> In my way of seeing it I would have to disambiguate {mi} between
> its two relevant referents in the context. Would you say that {mi}
> has two intensions/senses that need disambiguation?
No, which is why the guise he is in is important. The fact is that as
long as the question is about what Lois wants, the opacity of that
wanting will infect everything thereafter.
So if {mi} is not ambiguous because it has two possible senses, then it
must be ambiguous because it has two possible referents. Or is there
some other possibility?
(I am not sure what to say if the question comes up while the being is in a neutral role, but then I am not sure he can have a neutral role.)
He could be naked, say in the sauna. Then {mi} would not have an
obvious preferred referent/sense and then we would have to answer
something like:
She wants Superman but not Clark to kiss her.
Plain {mi} would simply be too vague in that context.
> mi sinma la klinton po'u le merko jatna ku'o .enai la klinton
> po'u le speni be la xilaris
I am not sure that {po'u} catches the force of "qua" -- but neither
does {no'u}, so there is more work to be domne, probably. But
something along this line is what is called for.
I'd say it has to be restrictive, so {po'u} has to be better than {no'u}.
What bothers you perhaps is that {la klinton} presumably has a
single referent, so how could it have two different restrictions. In my view,
without ultimate tokens, the very use of {po'u} indicates that in this
context we have to consider that more than one referent is subsumed
under the more ordinary single referent of {la klinton}.
> The difference would be that I would have the one person subsume the > two personas, whereas you (perhaps) would not allow this kind of > subsumption. Well, I wouldn't call it subsumption. I would just say that two names (with different senses) refer to the same thing, which is just what actually is happening -- no mysterious objects that aren't there or are subsumed under another.
But it is hard to see that {mi} or {la klinton} have two different senses.
I suspect that a lot of this is terminological, but both terminolgies come with a considerable theory behind it, so the issue is what theory works best. The sense-reference theory has a long track record; the relative-absolute identity, aside from not being a sensible way of talking, has no appreciable track record at all.
The disadvantage of the sense-reference theory is that Lojban does not
seem to have any obvious way of implementing it, whereas nothing new
needs to be introduced for the relative-absolute identity theory. There is
already the predicate {mintu} which is pretty much what relative identity is.
mu'o mi'e xorxes