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--- In jboske@yahoogroups.com, "Jorge Llambías" <jjllambias@...> wrote:
>
> On 9/19/06, John E. Clifford <clifford-j@...> wrote:
> > --- In jboske@yahoogroups.com, "Jorge Llambías" <jjllambias@> wrote:
> >
> > How so? Tjhe question is whether a particular move is valid.
>
> The move in question, I take it, is from "Fa" to "ExFx".
> That move is always valid, as far as I'm concerned.
Actually, it is the more specialized one, in Lojban terms from {F lo
broda} to {da poi broda zo'u F da} from "F a dog" to "there is a dog
such that F it." This works in extensional cases, not intensional
ones. The idea is to get it to work in all cases (by making the
places extesnional (though containing -- and thus quantifying on --
intensional objects).
> The move from "Fa" to "Ex(Zx&Fx)" (where Z is the predicate {zasti})
> is not a move of logic, and does not always work.
And, so far as I can tell, no one has said it does -- or even
mentioned it except you.
> In the restricted domain where AxZx is true (the "real world" domain),
> the move from "Fa" to "Ex(Zx&Fx)" will work. When using such a
> restricted domain we won't be able to refer to things that don't exist,
> obviously, since they won't be in the domain.
But here even the simple generalization does not work from intensional
contexts "I want a unicorn" does not permit "There is a unicorn I
want" though the first can be true in the "real world" domain and the
(let's suppose it's this real world" is not. Yet it appears to be of
the Fa to ExFx pattern.
> > Showing
> > there is a domain in which it does not work (true premises, false
> > conclusion) is enough to show that it is not valid.
>
> There is no domain in which the move does not work, as far as I can see.
One just indicated.
> When doing an interpretation, we first we have to figure out what is in
> the domain of discourse. This is a metalinguistic process (in the object
> language, everything is in the universe of discourse, by definition,
> so there is nothing to figure out in that respect.) Every referring term
> contributes its referent(s) to the domain of discourse. If we fail
to assign
> a referent to a referring term, we must resort to the metalinguistic
{ki'a}.
> We must step out of the discourse, as it were, and clarify the language,
> because the discourse is not working as it should.
I think that this is where you get it screwed up. Every referring
term *in primary occurrence* does indeed contribute its referent (I
suppose we are doing something like discourse analysis where the
domain is built up as we go along). But secondary occurrences do not.
Unfortunately,for most secondary occurrences, there are primary
occurrences that look on the surface just like them. In terms of that
article you pointed to, they have both a specific and a generic
reading -- and the generic reading does certain not point to a
particular item but also does not guarantee any such item at all. "A
bear did not do this" would ordinarily be taken as simply a denail of
"A bear did this" and thre denial takes out both any specificity there
might be in "a bear" and also the existential import about bears. It
is just ~Db (or ~Ex(Bx & Dx). There is also the specific reading (I
don't actually like these terms but they come from the article which I
assume you have read)which \x~Dx(b) or Ex(Bx & \y~Dy(x)), which in
either reading says that there are bears and furthermore that some
particular one of them did not do this (though another one may have --
consider the grade-school riddle:"I have two coins that add up to 30
cents and one of them is not a nickel.") There are similar cases for
most secondary occurrences (the article gives some for intensional
direct objects and some adjectives ("imaginary"). The point is that
the secomdary occurrences of referring expressions need not refer to
anything in the domain -- and so do not automatically add something
when they first occur. And what they need not add is not just a
specific thing but even the whole predicate extension: "I want a
unicorn" adds to the domain not only not a particular unicorn but not
unicorns at all. To think that secondary occurrences add particular
references or even generic ones (guarantee that a certain predicate
has a non-null extension) generates one array of either paraadoxes or
misconstruals of ordinary -- and ordinarily understood -- sentences.
It is, as you note, exceedingly difficult to have a primary
occurrence of a referring expression that fails to refer. It can
basically only happen when we have in mind a holistic model into which
the developing situation is to be fitted to test for truth and that
model does not contain anything to which the expression might refer.
We havwe then either to scra[ that background model or reject the
referring expression (Oh, we're talking about..., I was thinking of
..." or "But we're not talking about ..."). It is unfortunate that
"primary occurrence" seems always to be defined negatively ("not in
the scope of....") and that, as investigations proceed, the list of
things in the diairesis gets longer and longer, but the distinction
remains basic to semantics of natural languages for all of that.
> > > > We say that two things are identical when we refer to the same
object
> > > > using expressions that have different sense.
> > >
> > > Why do you say "two things" then? Can two things be one and
> > > the same object?
> >
> > We tend to say there are two things when we mean there are two
> > denoting expressions. I think I said it carefully at least once, but
> > that is tedious and hardly anyone who is a cooperative
> > conversationalist misunderstands the other expression.
>
> I agree it's easy to understand. I'm not convinced that the theory that
> says that this way of speaking is just sloppy usage is better than the
> theory that says that this way of speaking is perfectly justifiable
uage.
I am afraid that I can't even figure out what a literal reading of the
sentence would be; as you point out, there can't be two things that
are identical in the same ways as there are two of them. They can be
two in one sense, identical in another, but that is not the issue here
(or, if it is, then there is no issue).
> > > Have you read
<http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity-relative/>?
> > >
> > Yeah. It didn't help since you seem to have reproduced its way of
> > talking fairly accurately and it is that way of talking that does not
> > make sense.
>
> To me it makes pretty good sense. It is in fact the only account of
> the "paradoxes of identity" that I have found satisfying. Is there any
> particular part that does not make sense to you?
Well, the notion that there are two kinds of identity, rahter tha
comparisons between two different things is a good starting point.
This seems simply a misuse of language and to fly in the face of what
we actually do.
> > > > > Suppose Superman/Clark comes to you and asks:
> > > > >
> > > > > Does Lois want me to kiss her?
> [...]
> > > does his question have any possible yes/no answer at all?
> >
> > Sure, especially if he asks in one guise or the other.
>
> Right, so the referent (or the sense?) of {mi} will vary depending
> on his guise. I think good answers in such case would be:
>
> Yes, but she doesn't want Clark to kiss her.
>
> No, but she does want Superman to kiss her.
Yup, that is just what I said.
> so as to make clear to Superman/Clark that his "me" must be interpreted
> in accordance with his current guise.
Indeed so, And your point would be? We are now comparing Superman
slices with Clark slices and finding them not identical, whereas, if
we compare the wholes from which the slices are cut, they are
identical. But there is only one sense of identity here.
> > > In my way of seeing it I would have to disambiguate {mi} between
> > > its two relevant referents in the context. Would you say that {mi}
> > > has two intensions/senses that need disambiguation?
> >
> > No, which is why the guise he is in is important. The fact is that as
> > long as the question is about what Lois wants, the opacity of that
> > wanting will infect everything thereafter.
>
> So if {mi} is not ambiguous because it has two possible senses, then it
> must be ambiguous because it has two possible referents. Or is there
> some other possibility?
That {mi} is not ambiguous (that it means the guise he is in). Or
that it is ambiguous between the slice and the whole. That is, I did
not say that {mi} is not ambiguous as to referents, in fact I gave the
case that it exactly was just that.
> > (I am not sure what to say if the question comes up
> > while the being is in a neutral role, but then I am not sure he can
> > have a neutral role.)
>
> He could be naked, say in the sauna. Then {mi} would not have an
> obvious preferred referent/sense and then we would have to answer
> something like:
>
> She wants Superman but not Clark to kiss her.
Yes, that is what I said at first, so it would surely apply even
better here.
> Plain {mi} would simply be too vague in that context.
Oh, I think it is ambiguous, but it would not work in any case.
> > > mi sinma la klinton po'u le merko jatna ku'o .enai la klinton
> > > po'u le speni be la xilaris
> >
> > I am not sure that {po'u} catches the force of "qua" -- but neither
> > does {no'u}, so there is more work to be done, probably. But
> > something along this line is what is called for.
>
> I'd say it has to be restrictive, so {po'u} has to be better than
{no'u}.
> What bothers you perhaps is that {la klinton} presumably has a
> single referent, so how could it have two different restrictions. In
my view,
> without ultimate tokens, the very use of {po'u} indicates that in this
> context we have to consider that more than one referent is subsumed
> under the more ordinary single referent of {la klinton}.
Well, I still don't like subsumed, but I can imagine different ways to
slice the whole and perhaps we can do a deal in that way. we do,
after slice on the temporal axis with {poi} and some clause don't we?
>
> > > The difference would be that I would have the one person subsume the
> > > two personas, whereas you (perhaps) would not allow this kind of
> > > subsumption.
> >
> > Well, I wouldn't call it subsumption. I would just say that two names
> > (with different senses) refer to the same thing, which is just what
> > actually is happening -- no mysterious objects that aren't there or
> > are subsumed under another.
>
> But it is hard to see that {mi} or {la klinton} have two different
senses.
Well, as soon as we spell out the difference we have two different
expressions, and hence almost certainly two different senses.
> > I suspect that a lot of this is
> > terminological, but both terminolgies come with a considerable theory
> > behind it, so the issue is what theory works best. The
> > sense-reference theory has a long track record; the relative-absolute
> > identity, aside from not being a sensible way of talking, has no
> > appreciable track record at all.
>
> The disadvantage of the sense-reference theory is that Lojban does not
> seem to have any obvious way of implementing it, whereas nothing new
> needs to be introduced for the relative-absolute identity theory.
There is
> already the predicate {mintu} which is pretty much what relative
identity is.
Well, then we need something for absolute identity. And, note, we
need the stuff for sense-reference anyhow, in some form or other.
And, if we do other things right, the "problems" that the
two-identities theory is meant to solve won't arise.