[YG Conlang Archives] > [jboske group] > messages [Date Index] [Thread Index] >
--- In jboske@yahoogroups.com, "Jorge Llambías" <jjllambias@...> wrote:
>
> On 9/19/06, John E. Clifford <clifford-j@...> wrote:
>
> > In any case, notice that I said the real world was where the domain
> > was restricted to -- not identical to -- the extension of {zasti}.
> > There are clearly domains of discourse that meet this pattern and in
> > them most clearly the move fails.
>
> If the domain of discourse is restricted to things that exist in
> the real world, then the move clearly fails. But saying that there are
> domains of discourse that are so restricted is begging the question.
How so? Tjhe question is whether a particular move is valid. Showing
ther is a domain in which it does not work (true premises, false
conclusion) is enough to show that it is not valid. The "real world
is such a case. there are others (indeed, it doesn't work in most
cases).
> The mere use of certain predicates in a discourse (for example the
> predicate "is imaginary" or "is desired" or "is needed") opens the
> domain to things that don't exist in the real world.
You should read that article on intensional transitive verbs more
carefully, since it deals with this issue fairly nicely. These
predicates are second order predicates that apply to properties or
individual concepts, not to objects (on one way of handling it -- the
one I prefer, of course).
> I suppose where
> we disagree is in that for me there is no way that something can be
> kept out of the domain of discourse when one of the participants
> decides to bring it up, and for you there are things that can be >kept
> out by one of the participants refusing to let it in.
A more critical difference is that you believe that *any* mention of a
thing brings it in and I think (see the article again) that there are
contexts in whihc something can be mentioned without getting into the
domain of discourse (though perhaps in a subordinate domain of some
sort). I do also think that any offer to add something can be met by
"But there aren't any ..." or "But we aren't talking about those ..."
and so the suggested critter doesn't in fact get in (or gets in only
to be driven out immediately).
> These fights about
> what is allowed into the discourse or not must be settled before we
> can make an interpretation anyway, and once the fights are settled,
> there is no paradox in "I want X" even if X does not exist: it is
true or
> false if the referent made it into the domain of discourse, and it is
> meaningless if the referent did not make it there.
Well, I had thought we had gotten past that problem already. The
paradox will still remain if the "X" in "I want X" refers to X (in
tight scope or whatever) so we either insist on broad scope (which
just is often wrong -- there is no dog I want when I want a dog) or we
say that "X" refers to something other than X.
>
> > We say that two things are identical when we refer to the same object
> > using expressions that have different sense.
>
> Why do you say "two things" then? Can two things be one and
> the same object?
We tend to say there are two things when we mean there are two
denoting expressions. I think I said it carefully at least once, but
that is tedious and hardly anyone who is a cooperative
conversationalist misunderstands the other expression.
> Under absolute identity, the answer is:
> "That's just a sloppy way of speaking. What we *really* mean when we
> say that two things are identical is that two expressions have the same
> referent."
Ah, so you do understand. So, what is the problem?
> Under relative identity, the answer is:
> "Yes, we may say that two things are relatively identical
> when they are both the same physical object, for example."
What two things, if they are identical at all? This is even sloppier
talking, since it 1) creates a different notion of identity where
there is not one and 2) creates a new type of object, a"logical
object," where there is no need for one.
> > The classic is still the Morning Star and the Evening Star.
>
> They are one star, but are they one or two things?
Well, what are you talking about when you say "they" (or "it")? If you
mean the physical object, then they are one thing. If you mean, the
object as seen at certain times of the day -- that is, slices of that
object across the temporal axis -- they are two (or more if you count
each slice as diofferent from all other slices). And, of course, if
what you are really comparing is senses, then there are clearly two.
> > Surely it is not enough for any
> > notion of identity to have them satisfy one predicate. I am not
> > getting any sense of what relative and absolute identity. as you use
> > these terms, means from this desription.
>
> Have you read <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity-relative/>?
>
Yeah. It didn't help since you seem to have reproduced its way of
talking fairly accurately and it is that way of talking that does not
make sense.
> > > Suppose Superman/Clark comes to you and asks:
> > >
> > > Does Lois want me to kiss her?
> > >
> > > What would you respond, and how do you justify it under your
> > > interpretation? (The assumption is that we know that Lois wants
> > > Superman to kiss her but does not want Clark to kiss her, and we
> > > know that Superman and Clark are the same person.)
> >
> > I would probably say that she wants to kiss Superman but not Clark
> > Kent.
>
> Right. But does his question have any possible yes/no answer at all?
Sure, especially if he asks in one guise or the other.
> In my way of seeing it I would have to disambiguate {mi} between
> its two relevant referents in the context. Would you say that {mi}
has two
> intensions/senses that need disambiguation?
No, which is why the guise he is in is important. The fact is that as
long as the question is about what Lois wants, the opacity of that
wanting will infect everything thereafter. And, of course, once we
get outside the opaque context -- talk about whether he really did
kiss her -- the identity laws apply as they appear to do and there is
again no problem. (I am not sure what to say if the question comes up
while the being is in a neutral role, but then I am not sure he can
have a neutral role.)
> >We make this kind of separation all the time -- it is the chief
> > use of the word "qua" in English. I admire Bill Clinton qua the
> > President of the United States but not qua the husband of Hillary. The
> > nice thing about descriptions is that they wear a large part of their
> > senses on their faces.
>
> Right. And my take is that that would work in Lojban too:
>
> mi sinma la klinton po'u le merko jatna ku'o .enai la klinton
> po'u le speni be la xilaris
I am not sure that {po'u} catches the force of "qua" -- but neither
does {no'u}, so there is more work to be domne, probably. But
something along this line is what is called for.
>
> But presumably you would not put it that way.
>
> > I assume, by the way, that logically
> > "Superman" and "Clark Kent" are descriptions of some sort, not proper
> > names. I suppose that the justification is that it is exactly true.
> > We are dealing here with senses (in the scope of "want") and the
> > senses are clearly different, so no paradox results, even though the
> > extensions of the two names are identical. I would suppose that you
> > would answer pretty much the same -- only talking about personas
> > rather than individual concepts or sense. Notice, there are not two
> > kinds of identity in either case, just comparison of two different
> > sorts of things.
>
> The difference would be that I would have the one person subsume the
> two personas, whereas you (perhaps) would not allow this kind of
> subsumption.
Well, I wouldn't call it subsumption. I would just say that two names
(with different senses) refer to the same thing, which is just what
actually is happening -- no mysterious objects that aren't there or
are subsumed under another. I suspect that a lot of this is
terminological, but both terminolgies come with a considerable theory
behind it, so the issue is what theory works best. The
sense-reference theory has a long track record; the relative-absolute
identity, aside from not being a sensible way of talking, has no
appreciable track record at all.