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John: > > And Rosta scripsit: > > > > > I believe there is a distinction between > > > > > > John said furze is not gorse > > > John said "Furze is not gorse" > > > > > > in the former, I describe John's dicta/beliefs using my words. In the > > > latter, I report his words/beliefs using his words. I take de dicto > > > to be the former > > > > I think this particular distinction is blurred in these belief- > > discussions, perhaps because we have no belief-verb in English that > > accepts a quotation True. It's important that we deblur it, though. > > > > > There is no problem with reporting this in Lojban. We just need one > > > > > predicate that denotes what Pierre's 'Londres' denotes and another > > > > > predicate that denotes what his 'London' denotes > > > > > > > > I don't think that such predicates can exist. Pierre's London is a real > > > > place, but his Londres is a projection of a concept that doesn't refer > > > > > > How come? I don't see them as having a different status. Both Pierrean > > > London and Pierrean Londres are concepts/categories/kinds. Whether > > > things in the real world actually instantiate them is neither here nor > > > there > > > > As I said before, this leeds to a sort of dualism, in which there are > > plain objects and kinds, and there is one or more kinds for every plain > > object. Indeed, it is difficult to see why one should have plain objects > > at all, since kinds more than cover them Indeed. This is exactly what I think. Plain objects are just bits of world that we believe match the properties of the Kind. > > But I cannot swallow this for Lojban Well, I think we shouldn't have to swallow one another's ontological ejaculates, so long as we can each tell a coherent and broadly satisfactory story about the phenomena at issue. --And.