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lo remna is an individual of humanity lo rismi is an individual quantity of the mass of rice: = lo pisu'o loi tu'o rismi remna is being treated as inherently-individual rismi is being treated as inherently-substance blue can mean either is-nothing-but-blue or is-at-least-partly-blue Take the former.is-nothing-but-blue is neutral: an entity can be individually is-nothing-but-blue (if you divide it any further, it's no longer true --- the cube blue on the outside, red on the inside),or it can be as a substance is-nothing-but-blue (blue on the outside and the inside.)
The former is {lo kairselci be leka ce'u blanu}
The latter is {lo kairgumna be leka ce'u blanu}
If {lo} corresponds to {kairselci} and {loi} to {kairgumna}, then the
former is {lo blanu}, and the latter is {loi blanu}.
The problem is, the latter is also {lo blanu}: it's {lo (pisu'o loi tu'o) blanu}
Coercion allows you to say that {lo blanu} is blue, and not just singularly countably blue --- but only by individuating it. {lo djacu} is not singulrly countably water --- it's uncountable water, scooped up into a measurable quantity.
This is a mess. OK. Now the brickbat.
>#Nora observes that since the ultimate definition of lo broda and le broda >#pertains to things that fill the x1 of broda, and since for various broda, >#the x1 place is expressed as individuals, sets, masses, and what have you, >#then le/lo manifestly MUST be ambiguous amongst those meanings, regardless >#of the specified default quantifiers and what people have deduced from the >#assignment of such quantifiers
No. No no no. If le/lo is ambiguous between mass and individual and set, then there *is no difference* between le, lei and le'i.
It's not that it's ambiguous, it's that everything can be coerced into everything else. This is not the same thing.
Rice is uncountable. But you can scoop it into measurable bowlfuls. People are countable. But you can put them into the Universal Grinder.Now. blanu can be predicated of both individually-blue and substance-blue things. Our two cubes (which are both individuals with respect to cubehood) are both such that blanu(x). One is {pa lo pa blanu}, and the other is {pa lo tu'o blanu} = {pa lo pisu'o loi tu'o blanu}.
So does {lo blanu} mean "something that is blue" rather than "something that is indivisibly blue"? Yes, iff we make not only the outer, but also the inner quantifier defeasible.
So coming back to an earlier instance, can we ultimately say that {lo remna} can mean {lo tu'o remna} after all, as in a scoop of humanity? If i allow both cubes to be {lo blanu}, then I must allow a scoop of humanity to be {lo remna} --- and distinguish between {lo ro remna} and {lo tu'o remna}.
If {lo remna} cannot mean {lo tu'o remna} = {pisu'o loi pisu'o lo ro remna},
then a blue substance cannot be {lo blanu}.
Think this through. A cube whose insides are blue consists of
infinitely many portions of bluedom, just as a glass of water
consists of infinitely many portions of waterdom. In that case, you
cannot think of {lo blanu} any differently than {lo djacu}. {ti
blanu} is the same as {ti djacu}, and {lo blanu} is the same as {lo
djacu}.
So what does {da djacu} mean? Surely not something that is individually water (what is?), but something that is a portion of water.
I will accept that {da remna} does mean something that is individually human, not a scoop of humanity.
But I do not accept that djacu or blanu have that constraint. In fact, if blanu is to behave as only one or the other (be inherent-individual or inherent-substance), it should be the inherent substance reading.
This makes the universe complicated, but I do now think individuation is something that has to come after quantification and prenex: the universe over which we quantify does not include only indivisible individuals, but also divisible quantities of substance.
So... da poi ke'a broda is a substance, if broda is inherently substance, and is an individual, if da poi ke'a broda is an individual. If broda is open, so is the denotation of da poi broda.
If this is heading towards saying that loi djacu and lo djacu are both potential referents of da poi djacu, and *that* is why lo djacu != da poi djacu, then I guess I can live with that. The metalanguage of CLL is still stuck in an atomist universe, isn't it?
---- Now I don't know who I'm disagreeing with.... -- **** **** **** **** **** **** **** **** **** **** **** **** **** **** **** * Dr Nick Nicholas, French & Italian Studies nickn@hidden.email * University of Melbourne, Australia http://www.opoudjis.net * "Eschewing obfuscatory verbosity of locutional rendering, the * circumscriptional appelations are excised." --- W. Mann & S. Thompson, * _Rhetorical Structure Theory: A Theory of Text Organisation_, 1987. * **** **** **** **** **** **** **** **** **** **** **** **** **** **** ****