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Jordan:
> On Wed, Dec 11, 2002 at 12:32:45AM -0000, And Rosta wrote:
> [...]
> > > Yeah. Look, lo means what we say it means, and so does lo'e, and in
> > > that of course Wittgenstein was right: meaning is use. But I'm going
> > > more and more structuralist, which means that to me, the meaning of
> > > {lo'e} is decided by the meaning of {lo}. When you say {lo merko}, you
> > > claim some objective knowledge of the membership of {American}.
> >
> > I don't know how strong a claim you mean to make here. {lo merko}
> > means "Ex, x is merko". Does that claim some objective knowledge
> > of the membership of {American}? No, in my opinion. One can quite
> > legimately deny that objective knowledge even exists. Lojban
> > shouldn't rule on epistemological issues, and the ruling is
> > unconnected to the difference between o-gadri and e-gadri
> [...]
>
> But it does *claim* objective knowledge. Whether the speaker
> actually *has* it is what is legitamately deniable[1], but that
> they're *claiming* it doesn't degrade lojban's "philisophical
> neutrality".
There's a danger of us talking at cross-purposes here, because we
haven't discussed this enough to establish a shared frame of
reference.
It seems to me that we can establish a number of distinct
epistemological frameworks within which communication is
viable.
1. The speaker claims that p is true only within a certain worldview
(which the addressee can comprehend).
2. The speaker claims that p is true only within a certain worldview
(which the addressee can comprehend) and that the worldview should
be shared by people in general.
3. The speaker claims that p is true only within a certain worldview
(which the addressee can comprehend) and that the worldview is
be shared by people in general.
4. The speaker claims that p is true only within a certain worldview
(which the addressee can comprehend) and that the worldview is and
should be shared by people in general.
5. The speaker claims that there is such a thing as objective reality
and that p is true of objective reality.
(When I say "claim", feel free to read "presuppose" where it seems
more appropriate.)
Doubtless one could get much more sophisticated than these possibilities,
but these five will suffice.
I opine that a bare jufra should be neutral among 1-5, and that if
there is a need to distinguish among them (as indeed there probably
is) then this is the job of a UI.
If I read you correctly, you are claiming that Lojban should prescribe
5 only. In the light of what I've said above, I hope you will see why
I think that violates metaphysical neutrality and why that is undesirable.
> Making rediculously claims is how people talk and
> think. For example "If I had more free time I'd go fishing" is an
> arguably philisophically rediculous claim (xod was saying something
> to this effect the other day[2]), but it's how we think, so things
> like mu'ei are justified, and having the ability to make *claims*
> of that sort does not do any harm to the pyny
I agree, but the sentence seems to me to be neutral among 1-5.
Change the example to "If she had more time, she'd go fishing". IMO
I can say that not only as a representation of (my notion of) reality
but also as a representation of reality as she sees it. I may not
believe that if she had more time she'd go fishing, but she may
believe it, and I may legitimately intend to represent her beliefs.
This is how English works, and perhaps language in general, though
conceivably some languages grammaticize point-of-view (which must
make, say, Jane Austen very dull to read in those languages). Again,
it would be the job of UI to distinguish between these two readings.
It occurs to me that if you wished to claim only that *sentences*
make claims about 'objective reality', and not that speakers uttering
the sentences necessarily do, then we could probably wrap the
discussion up in consensus.
> [1] pe'i the term "objective knowledge" can mean various degrees
> of objectivity; but in the strictest (and only the strictest) sense
> it's clearly impossible to possess
>
> [2] Xod's thing was that there's only 1 world, so claims about
> "possible worlds" or what "could be" or what is "possible" etc are
> a bunch of crap. He was speaking specifically of mu'ei, which I
> don't think actually has the problems he described it since the
> notion of "world" is much more specifically defined. I tried to
> start a thread on this but it's unfortunately painfully apparent
> that le'e jboskepre cu to'e nelci lo'enu ri casnu bau la lojban
I agree with you about mu'ei.
I just don't have the time to read and write Lojban on a daily basis,
and furthermore I find it an impediment to communication, both because
it's harder to get one's ideas across and because it introduces
distractions (-- one gets sidetracked not just what someone says but
also about how they say it). I can't sightread Lojban, so due to
lack of time I have to delete your lojban exchanges with Jorge unread,
interesting though I'm sure they are, while messages like your posting
on mu'ei get left in my inbox till I have time to read them (which
basically means never, since I currently have 6000 messages in my inbox
that I at one time meant to get round to replying to). And new email
keeps on pouring in at a rate of 400 nonspam messages a day. It's doing
my head in.
--And.