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--- In jboske@yahoogroups.com, "Jorge Llambías" <jjllambias@...> wrote:
>
> On 9/19/06, John E. Clifford <clifford-j@...> wrote:
> > The problem is (partly) that Lojban (and
> > English) is type-flat, expressions of all different types are treated
> > as the same -- they can all substitute for thing-variables (though
> > only predicates can substitute for predicate-variables, a Lojban
> > feature).
> [...]
> > In English, this step is
> > hidden because we get only the down version, "a dog," showing. In
> > Lojban, as a logical language, it makes for greater consistency (and
> > not having to remember the list) to leave the intension showing.
>
> If Lojban, like English, is type-flat, how can we leave the intension
> showing in Lojban?
By having a marker that it is an intension. We have markers that
things are peopwerties and propositions and the like. Just because
they are all "things" doesn't mean we can't distinguish among them i9n
various ways and indeed Lojban already does (an intensions may already
be there in some form).
>
> > Oh, as you know, exactly the same problem arises with "there is" as
> > with "there are" -- you can't wish something into the universe of
> > discourse any more than you can wish it into reality.
>
> You don't need to wish it into the domain of discourse. All you need
> do is mention it.
But you have to mention it in an appropriate way. Saying it after "I
want..." is not an apprpriate way.
> > You can expand
> > tre universe of discourse, of course, but wanting something doesn't do
> > it.
>
> Of course. Mentioning it is what does it, not wanting it.
I meant "mentioning it in an expression of a want."
> > (Incidentally, the fact that some move
> > fails in the real world -- where variable range over only the
> > extension of {zasti} -- means that it fails, since the real world is a
> > universe of discourse, too.)
>
> The real world for me consists of all the things that are real, it
has nothing
> to do with domains of discourse, it is made up of all the things
that satisfy
> the predicate {zasti}, whether we talk about them or not, and it is not
> a set, it has those existing things as its constituent parts. The domain
> of a given discourse for me is the set of things that are referred to in
> that discourse. The things referred to in a discourse need not exist in
> the world where the discourse takes place.
There are some problems with that view, but they can be dealt with.
In any case, notice that I said the real world was where the domain
was restricted to -- not identical to -- the extension of {zasti}.
There are clearly domains of discourse that meet this pattern and in
them most clearly the move fails.
> Could you please define what you mean by "the real world" and what you
> mean by "universe of discourse"? I can't figure out what "the real
world is
> a universe of discourse, too" means with my understanding of these
> expressions.
See above.
>
> > There is only one kind of identity: "a = b" is true just in case "a"
> > refers to exactly what "b" refers to. I am not at all sure what is
> > meant by "relative" and "absolute" then.
>
> We say that two things (notice the "two"!) are relatively identical
> when, for some predicate F, they are the same F. (They cannot be
> absolutely identical, or they would not be two things).
We say that two things are identical when we refer to the same object
using expressions that have different sense. The classic is still the
Morning Star and the Evening Star. Surely it is not enough for any
notion of identity to have them satisfy one predicate. I am not
getting any sense of what relative and absolute identity. as you use
these terms, means from this desription. It would appear that
relative identity is not identity at all. But the problems arise when
there is a genuine identity, but not the one that works in a
particular context.
> For example, we may say that two different things such as a dog and
> the dog minus one of its hairs, are one and the same dog, even though
> they are not the same identical logical object.
Well, this deals (of course) with the identitoes of two different
things. As individual creatures, they are identical (slices of the
single space-time worm or what have you; the anysis of personal
identity is very complex but the cases are generally easy to
recognize). But they are not the same segment, so on a microlevel
they differ. This does not seem to be what happens in the typical
opaque context case, though I suppose it could be made to work on ones
like the Superman/Clark Kent example. The standard solution, using
sense and reference, is more general and well-established. There is
no need -- in these cases anyhow -- for the putative relative/absolute
distinction. You just need to say what you are comparing.
>
> > > To summarize:
> > > Intensional contexts can be characterized by three "anomalies"
> > > (according to
> > <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/intensional-trans-verbs/>):
> > > (1) failure of interchange of identicals
> > > (2) ambiguity between "specific" and "unspecific" reading of the
object
> > > (3) failure of existential commitment
> >
> >
> > Well, I tend to equate 2 and 3 since they are both easily seen as
> > consequences of scope differences -- is the quantifier inside or
> > outside the context.
> >
> >
> > > (1) is resolved by not confusing relative identity with absolute
> > identity.
> >
> > That is by noting that the expression refers to its referent or to its
> > sense.
>
> The idea here is that we should not be too quick to claim that
> "Superman" and "Clark Kent" have the same absolute referent just
> because they refer to the same person. They may refer to the same
> person but to different persona, for example, in which case their
> respective referents are not absolutely identical. There are two
different
> referents involved, that happen to be the same person.
Right. So, as individuals (discrete continuous etc, etc,) they are
identical, as "personas" (do you want to take up theology?) they are
different. So, I suppose you resolve this puzzle by distinguishing
what you compare -- bodies in one case, personas in the other. It
seems to me to be only terminologically different from the standard
explanation: in one case the referent of the words "Superman" aand
"Clark Kent," in the other the idividual concepts with each. and I
suspect that much of what can be said about personas can be translated
into talk about individual concepts and conversely. But the talk
about different kinds of identity just muddies the water -- there is
only identity, but different things, expressed by the same words, get
compared.
> I think this is worth reading:
> <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity-relative/>
>
> > What does this mean? Are there ordinary objects and logical objects?
> > What sort of thing is the latter? I suppose this means that two
> > different senses may bring us to the same thing. So, once we see that
> > the issue is about the senses, not the thing, the problem disappears
> > (this latter is more clear than talk of logical objects, which is at
> > least misleading where it is not simply muddled).
>
> Suppose Superman/Clark comes to you and asks:
>
> Does Lois want me to kiss her?
>
> What would you respond, and how do you justify it under your
> interpretation? (The assumption is that we know that Lois wants
> Superman to kiss her but does not want Clark to kiss her, and we
> know that Superman and Clark are the same person.)
>
I would probably say that she wants to kiss Superman but not Clark
Kent. We make this kind of separation all the time -- it is the chief
use of the word "qua" in English. I admire Bill Clinton qua the
President of the United States but not qua the husband of Hillary. The
nice thing about descriptions is that they wear a large part of their
senses on their faces. I assume, by the way, that logically
"Superman" and "Clark Kent" are descriptions of some sort, not proper
names. I suppose that the justification is that it is exactly true.
We are dealing here with senses (in the scope of "want") and the
senses are clearly different, so no paradox results, even though the
extensions of the two names are identical. I would suppose that you
would answer pretty much the same -- only talking about personas
rather than individual concepts or sense. Notice, there are not two
kinds of identity in either case, just comparison of two different
sorts of things.
> > > (2) is resolved by allowing that the referent of an expression
can vary
> > > with context in the type-token axis. The "specific" reading
> > corresponding
> > > to the "token" reading, and the "unspecific" reading to the "type"
> > reading.
> > > (<http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/types-tokens/>)
> >
> > The specific-general axis does not seem to have any relevance here,
> > though I assume you are going to show how it does.
>
> I was using the terms as used in the link I posted::
> <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/intensional-trans-verbs/>
Well, I still don't see how this works exactly -- or, more accurately,
how it fits in with the difference in context. The problems here fit
into a well-established theory about the scope of terms in opaque
contexts (whether they are inside or out). The token-type axis
obscures this without adding anything informative in its place. In
short, this is not a very convincing piece.
>
> > > (3) is resolved by not confusing membership in the universe of
discourse
> > > with existence. Members of the universe of discourse are not
required
> > > to satisfy the predicate {zasti}. Mentioning something does not
commit
> > > one to its existence.
> >
> > Sorry, the existence trick doesn't really work. If the move fails
> > when the quantifiers mean "exist," since that restricted domain is
> > also a domain.
>
> I guess our different understanding of what "domain" means will
> prevent our ever being able to communicate effectively about this.
We understand each other perfectly (or at least I understand you) and
the point is that your theory that a reference occurring anywhere in a
sentence (or discourse) means that the corresponding thing has entered
the main domain/universe of discourse is just false to linguistic
fact. Logic reflects this by not allowing generalization outside the
context. Since we can, of course, add new thing to the basic domain
(and do all the time), there are lots of cases where mentioning
something does put it in the domain. Opaque contexts are not such
cases, however.