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On 9/19/06, John E. Clifford <clifford-j@hidden.email> wrote:
The problem is (partly) that Lojban (and English) is type-flat, expressions of all different types are treated as the same -- they can all substitute for thing-variables (though only predicates can substitute for predicate-variables, a Lojban feature).
[...]
In English, this step is hidden because we get only the down version, "a dog," showing. In Lojban, as a logical language, it makes for greater consistency (and not having to remember the list) to leave the intension showing.
If Lojban, like English, is type-flat, how can we leave the intension showing in Lojban?
Oh, as you know, exactly the same problem arises with "there is" as with "there are" -- you can't wish something into the universe of discourse any more than you can wish it into reality.
You don't need to wish it into the domain of discourse. All you need do is mention it.
You can expand tre universe of discourse, of course, but wanting something doesn't do it.
Of course. Mentioning it is what does it, not wanting it.
(Incidentally, the fact that some move
fails in the real world -- where variable range over only the
extension of {zasti} -- means that it fails, since the real world is a
universe of discourse, too.)
The real world for me consists of all the things that are real, it has nothing
to do with domains of discourse, it is made up of all the things that satisfy
the predicate {zasti}, whether we talk about them or not, and it is not
a set, it has those existing things as its constituent parts. The domain
of a given discourse for me is the set of things that are referred to in
that discourse. The things referred to in a discourse need not exist in
the world where the discourse takes place.
Could you please define what you mean by "the real world" and what you
mean by "universe of discourse"? I can't figure out what "the real world is
a universe of discourse, too" means with my understanding of these
expressions.
There is only one kind of identity: "a = b" is true just in case "a" refers to exactly what "b" refers to. I am not at all sure what is meant by "relative" and "absolute" then.
We say that two things (notice the "two"!) are relatively identical when, for some predicate F, they are the same F. (They cannot be absolutely identical, or they would not be two things). For example, we may say that two different things such as a dog and the dog minus one of its hairs, are one and the same dog, even though they are not the same identical logical object.
> To summarize: > Intensional contexts can be characterized by three "anomalies" > (according to <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/intensional-trans-verbs/>): > (1) failure of interchange of identicals > (2) ambiguity between "specific" and "unspecific" reading of the object > (3) failure of existential commitment Well, I tend to equate 2 and 3 since they are both easily seen as consequences of scope differences -- is the quantifier inside or outside the context. > (1) is resolved by not confusing relative identity with absolute identity. That is by noting that the expression refers to its referent or to its sense.
The idea here is that we should not be too quick to claim that "Superman" and "Clark Kent" have the same absolute referent just because they refer to the same person. They may refer to the same person but to different persona, for example, in which case their respective referents are not absolutely identical. There are two different referents involved, that happen to be the same person. I think this is worth reading: <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity-relative/>
What does this mean? Are there ordinary objects and logical objects? What sort of thing is the latter? I suppose this means that two different senses may bring us to the same thing. So, once we see that the issue is about the senses, not the thing, the problem disappears (this latter is more clear than talk of logical objects, which is at least misleading where it is not simply muddled).
Suppose Superman/Clark comes to you and asks: Does Lois want me to kiss her? What would you respond, and how do you justify it under your interpretation? (The assumption is that we know that Lois wants Superman to kiss her but does not want Clark to kiss her, and we know that Superman and Clark are the same person.)
> (2) is resolved by allowing that the referent of an expression can vary > with context in the type-token axis. The "specific" reading corresponding > to the "token" reading, and the "unspecific" reading to the "type" reading. > (<http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/types-tokens/>) The specific-general axis does not seem to have any relevance here, though I assume you are going to show how it does.
I was using the terms as used in the link I posted:: <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/intensional-trans-verbs/>
> (3) is resolved by not confusing membership in the universe of discourse
> with existence. Members of the universe of discourse are not required
> to satisfy the predicate {zasti}. Mentioning something does not commit
> one to its existence.
Sorry, the existence trick doesn't really work. If the move fails
when the quantifiers mean "exist," since that restricted domain is
also a domain.
I guess our different understanding of what "domain" means will prevent our ever being able to communicate effectively about this. mu'o mi'e xorxes