[YG Conlang Archives] > [jboske group] > messages [Date Index] [Thread Index] >
On Mon, 13 Jan 2003, Jorge Llambias wrote:
> la xod cusku di'e
>
> > > {ko'a krici le du'u broda ije ko'a krici le du'u brode}
> > > does not logically entail {ko'a krici le du'u ge broda
> > > gi brode}.
> >
> >It does only for rational people.
>
> Even if that were true, and supposing I were rational, I
> don't know whether ko'a is rational, so I can't make the
> entailment. It is not a logical theorem. The inner ge...gi...
> is something that ko'a believes or not. The outer ije is
> something that the speaker claims. When ko'a is not the
> speaker, they are clearly different claims.
>
> But we've already had this discussion before and we are not
> advancing any.
>
> >Otherwise you must work out the theory
> >that shows why {the relationship between the chance of beliefs being
> >wrong} is different than any other probabilistic situation.
>
> The uncertainty only complicates the original claim, but doesn't
> change the underlying issue. John might have said:
>
> - For each belief x that I hold with certainty 1, I believe
> with certainty 1 that x is true.
> - I also believe with certainty 1 that there is at least one
> belief (I don't know which one) which I hold with certainty 1
> but is false.
>
> Those two are not logical contradictions. They would be contradictory
> if the quantifier were moved into or out of the subordinate
> proposition, but logic does not allow such a movement.
I believe that one of the 10 coins in my pocket is painted green. If I
yank out a coin, I MUST admit there is a 1/10 chance of it being green.
There is no choice.
--
// if (!terrorist)
// ignore ();
// else
collect_data ();