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la xod cusku di'e
> {ko'a krici le du'u broda ije ko'a krici le du'u brode}
> does not logically entail {ko'a krici le du'u ge broda
> gi brode}.
It does only for rational people.
Even if that were true, and supposing I were rational, I don't know whether ko'a is rational, so I can't make the entailment. It is not a logical theorem. The inner ge...gi... is something that ko'a believes or not. The outer ije is something that the speaker claims. When ko'a is not the speaker, they are clearly different claims. But we've already had this discussion before and we are not advancing any.
Otherwise you must work out the theory
that shows why {the relationship between the chance of beliefs being
wrong} is different than any other probabilistic situation.
The uncertainty only complicates the original claim, but doesn't change the underlying issue. John might have said: - For each belief x that I hold with certainty 1, I believe with certainty 1 that x is true. - I also believe with certainty 1 that there is at least one belief (I don't know which one) which I hold with certainty 1 but is false. Those two are not logical contradictions. They would be contradictory if the quantifier were moved into or out of the subordinate proposition, but logic does not allow such a movement. mu'o mi'e xorxes _________________________________________________________________MSN 8 with e-mail virus protection service: 2 months FREE* http://join.msn.com/?page=features/virus