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Xod: > On Thu, 24 Oct 2002, And Rosta wrote: > > > Xod: > > > On Wed, 23 Oct 2002, And Rosta wrote: > > > > > > > Xod: > > > > > On Wed, 23 Oct 2002, And Rosta wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > But only two Lojbanists have come > > > > > > up with sustained and relatively coherent (-- coherent enough > > > > > > to be debated, at least) explicit accounts of these gadri -- Jorge > > > > > > and me > > > > > > > > > > That's right. The rest of us are using them and understanding > each other > > > > > perfectly well > > > > > > > > IMO, a basic premise of jboske is that whether people use x and > > > > understand each other perfectly well is largely irrelevant to jboske > > > > We know from the study of natlang that ordinary people have no trouble > > > > understanding each other even when what they say is very different > > > > from what they mean. (People with impaired theory-of-mind faculties, > > > > e.g. autistics, are less good at this, because the ability heavily > > > > replies on being able to guess how the other person thinks.) So > > > > being understood is not relevant to the question of "what does this > > > > sentence mean?" > > > > > > You seem to be implying here that meaning exists outside of the two people > > > engaging in communication > > > > Absolutely I am. John and I have been having a coldwar sort of argument > > about this for years, each of us thinking the other insane > > OK, here you step up to the plate.. > > > First of all, I see language (or 'grammar' in the sense of the rule > > system of the language -- 'langue' in the Saussurean sense) as a > > code. If I want to communicate idea X to you, I don't necessarily > > have to utter a sentence that encodes X. I can utter a sentence > > that encodes Y, such that I am confident that from Y you will infer > > X > > > > How is the code determined? For natlangs, we define the meaning of a > > sentence as that element of meaning that is constant across contexts > > -- across multiple utterances of the sentence. For Lojban, though, > > we work it out deductively from general principles (such as the > > principle that the language is consistent, regular, unambiguous, > > etc., that scope is left to right, etc. etc.) > > ....but never take a swing. I will rephrase my challenge. You seemed to > imply that meaning (the interpretation of symbols) exists outside the > consciousnesses of the participants in the discussion Well, yes. But I take that view about most knowledge. Laws of societies and rules of games (e.g. chess, football, tick/tig/tag/it/he, scissors- paper-stone) would be the closest analogues. On a drearily empiricist view they don't exist outside of consciousness, so if you take such a view then I will grant you the point. But in my second paragraph quoted above, I do say why language exists outside the conscious *of the two people engaged in conversation*. So I did take a swing. --And. --And.