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On 9/26/06, John E. Clifford <clifford-j@hidden.email> wrote:
--- In jboske@yahoogroups.com, "Jorge Llambías" <jjllambias@...> wrote: > But the > new model is not a model containing only John and elephants in its > domain of discourse, the new model contains unicorns too. OK, do it that way. But then notice that we go back to the old model almost immediately, retaining the new sentence as justified.
I would say that for as long as we retain the new sentence, we have not gone back to the old model, which did not include the sentence. Model = Domain+Theory. The new sentence cannot be in the theory if it's about something not in the domain, and in any case a change in the theory is a change in the model.
Every
model contains inherently other models to which it makes passing
reference in the course of dealing weith its situation. The word
"want" (or {djica}) calls up such a subordinate model, a wantworld.
Tha lasts for a short time in the course of a conversation and then
folds back out of the original model, but it leaves the expression
ofthe wish behind as a truth of the original model (just as a reductio
proof leaves ~p brehind after closing off the model built on p).
Model_0: Does not contain p in its theory. Model_1: Includes p and turns out to be inconsistent, so the model is ditched. Model_2: Includes the theory of Model_0 plus ~p. The examination of Model_1 was helpful to determine that Model_0 could be expanded to Model_2. Model_0: Contains nothing about unicorns. Model_1: Contains unicorns in its domain and the sentence "John wants unicorns" in its theory. Model_2: Adds the sentence about unicorns to the theory of Model_0 but not the unicorns to the domain? I find this Model_2 unsatisfactory.
> If you are happy interpreting that sentence as involving hidden
> propositions, that might work. I prefer an analysis that does not
> make use of hidden things. For me all that the interpretation of
> {la djan djica lo pavyseljirna} requires is a domain of discourse
> with (at least) two members, John and unicorns. The sentence
> can then be added as a true sentence of the model. It does not
> entail that {lo pavyseljirna cu zasti} must also be a true sentence
> of the model, but then why should it? I do not accept that
> {ro da zasti} has to be a true sentence of every model.
We largely agree, except that I hold (with most other folk who do this
sort of thing) that {la djan djica lo pavyseljirna} can be true in a
model that has no unicorns in it, just John even.
I assume you mean "I hold that 'John wants unicorns' can be true
in a model that has no unicorns in it", i.e. you hold that the English
sentence cannot be formalized (in the relevant interpretation) as an
ordinary FOPL formula "Fab". Or do you really mean that the Lojban
sentence {la djan djica lo pavyseljirna} cannot be so formalized?
I am not a pro enough to lay out all the arguments for this nor, indeed, to explain all the details of how and why it works (even one version of it, let alone the several that come to the same point along different paths), I merely note the consensus -- which, I admit, agrees with my intuitions and so ranks ahead of possible other approaches that have different results.
None of the relevant articles in the Stanford Encyclopedia site seem to be aware of there being such a consensus.
But, on the other hand, I don't know of any professional approach that goes your way (of course, I stopped looking when I found one I liked). The main line among the people I like has been that doing it your way 1) ignored linguistic data -- like the scope problems and 2) was clearly influenced by a surface sructure which clearly had a more complex deep structure (from that data again). As I have pointed out many times, I agree with that assessment and, thus, think your proposal is merely a lsst-ditch effort to save what is simply malglico in the context of a logical language.
For my part, I find nothing in logic that settles the ontological issue, and would thus force a preferred ontological perspective on a logical language. Here's another interesting article that bears on the matter: <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/nonexistent-objects/> mu'o mi'e xorxes