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--- In jboske@yahoogroups.com, "Jorge Llambías" <jjllambias@...> wrote:
>
> On 9/23/06, John E. Clifford <clifford-j@...> wrote:
> >
> > Let's see. {lo pavyseljirna} is a simple referring term -- it gets its
> > meaning directly from the interpretation in the model.
>
> Yes. For definiteness, let's consider a simple model:
>
> The universe of discourse is a set with three elements:
> U={John, unicorns, elephants}.
I assume you mean "unicorn" and "elephant", otherwise there would be
more than three things in the universe.
> The theory of the model is the following set of four sentences:
> T={"la djan djica lo pavyseljirna", "la djan na djica lo xanto",
> "lo pavyseljirna na zasti", "lo xanto cu zasti"}.
>
> > There are two different kinds of interpretations, one that makes
> > {lo pavyseljirna} act like a broad scope case and one that makes
> > it act like a narrow scope case.
>
> An interpretation will assign unicorns as the referent of {lo
pavyseljirna},
> elephants as the referent of {lo xanto}, and John as the referent of
> {la djan}. In this simple model, we don't run into any scope issues.
> Each referring term has a single referent in the domain of discourse,
> and we have not used quantifiers in the sentences of the theory.
We can, of course, as whether the quantified sentences are true. They
both (da poi pavyseljirna zo'u la djan djica da} and {da poi xanto
zo'u la djan djica da}) appear to be true on one reading -- where the
expression after {djica} refers to the same unicorn or elephant, the
only one there is. But, of course, we would not usually confine the
wants to what there happens to be, so, on the second reading, both are
false. I don't see how this has helped.
> Which of these are you intending for your model? Or is
> > there a third type not yet mentioned? You claim that on your model
> > the argument is valid, so it cannot be the model where {lo
> > pavyseljirna} acts like a narrow scope, since the argument is invalid
> > on that.
>
> Narrow scope of what with respect to what? There are no quantifiers in
> the simple sentence {la djan cu djica lo pavyseljirna}.
Well, there is {lo pavyseljirna} which has a scope like any NP. There
is also, at a deeper level the quantifiers that are inherent in the
semantics of {djica}, the two embedded in the two counterfactuals
about satisfaction -- but I don't think these need to come into this.
> We can now introduce quantifiers, and an inference rule of Logic
tells us
> that from {la djan cu djica lo pavyseljirna} it follows that {su'o
da zo'u
> la djan djica da}. Therefore this is a true sentence of the theory too,
> because any sentence that follows logically from true sentences of the
> theory will also be a true sentence of the theory.
Yes, that much follows in any case.
> > So, it must be the other one, broad scope. But, since we
> > know that there are models in which the argument is not vlaid, the
> > argument is not valid simpliciter. It is, however, valid on models
> > that emulate the broad scope quantifier. So you are claiming that,
> > contrary to the empirical evidence, the meaning of {mi djica lo
> > pavyseljirna} is always the broad scope reading. So, how do we do the
> > narrow scope one, which surely turns up from time to time?
>
> In order to distinguish two scope readings we need a model whose theory
> contains a sentence with at least two (non-commutative) operators. For
> example, we could have a new model with many unicorns as members
> of the domain of discourse, instead of the simple model above where
> unicorns were a single member of the domain. Then we could distinguish:
Are you really taking plural unicorns as a single thing? If you
wander off that far from ordinary usage, I am not sure I can follow
your nor what whatever results you get will tell us about ordinary usage.
> su'o da poi pavyseljirna zo'u mi djica lo du'u mi ponse da
>
> from:
>
> mi djica lo du'u su'o da poi pavyseljirna zo'u mi ponse da
>
> In a given theory, one of these sentences might be true and the other
> might be false.
>
> Any discourse can be seen as a process of model building. Through
> their use of language the participants negotiate what things are in the
> domain of discourse of the model and what sentences are the true
> sentences that conform the theory of the model. In some context, a
> simple model where unicorns are a single element of the domain of
> discourse might suffice to communicate whatever the participants in
> the discourse wish to communicate. In another context, the participants
> might wish to build a more detailed model where many unicorns are
> each a separate member of the domain of discourse. In this new context,
> more complex sentences will be needed to deal with the different scoping
> issues that now arise.
You seem to be serious with this rather bad joke, so please explain
how "unicorns" can be singular other than as a typo. I agree that if
someone says {lo pavyseljirna} in a primary place, I take it that
there is at least one unicorn in his universe and adjust the universe
I am constructing accordingly (or get him to readjust his). But this
does not say anything about the critters John wants: in your mini
universe, John could want a hippopotamus or a centaur without changing
anything.