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--- In jboske@yahoogroups.com, "Jorge Llambías" <jjllambias@...> wrote:
>
> On 9/21/06, John E. Clifford <clifford-j@...> wrote:
> >
> > As I keep pointing out, the real world is a legitimate model. If
> > someting fails in the real world case, then if fails outright.
>
> Is a model where the universe of discourse is restricted to numbers
> a legitimate model? {mi viska lo gerku} fails in that model, because
> neither {mi} nor {lo gerku} have referents there. Then {mi viska lo
gerku}
> fails outright? That doesn't sound right. Just because {mi djica
> lo pavyseljirna} fails in a model where all the referents must be in
> the extension of {zasti}, it does not mean that the utterance fails
> outright. It only means that such a model is not capable of dealing
> with that utterance.
Yes, the number model is legitmate. It is, of course, possible that
all these sentences are true in this model, though they would none of
them have the same meaning. But that is clearly beside the point.
Note -- your deliberately hiding this point is getting annoying --
that it is not the sentence but the inference from {mi djica lo
pavyseljirna} to {da poi pavyseljirna zo'u mi djica da}. The first
sentence may well be true in the real world (I've known some people
who at least claimed to want a unicorn), but the second ssentence is
false, so the inference is invalid. This is different from what
happens in genuine primary occurrences, where the infernce is valid.
> > In short, of course I can claim to want a unicorn in a
> > domain that contains no unicorns; to claim otherwise is to fly in the
> > face of linguistic evidence (try picking up that "a unicorn" with "it"
> > in a declarative sentence, for example, let alone by a quantifier).
>
> That's not that difficult:
> A: I want a unicorn. It's something I have always wanted.
> B: But what is it? I've never heard of unicorns before.
> A: It's a mythical creature. It's similar to a horse with a horn on
> its forehead.
There are two explanations for this anomolous case and I don't know
which is better. One is that the "it" doesn't pick up the reference
of "a unicorn" but rather its sense (what is the reference there).
The second is that the reference continues in the want world and does
not come out to the initial world at all. In fact, both explanations
are probably correct, since they fit together so smoothly. Now try a
case that clearly is not about the sense: describing the unicorn, say.
>
> > > Two things can be the same F and different G's, that's the only
> > > significance of relative identity.
> >
> > But then it is odd to talk about a different kind of identity, since
> > it is only about comparing things in different way or or different
> > things in the same way.
>
> It's not my choice of terminology.
Well, it is you who in this discussion have chosen to introduce this
theory, so you are stuck with some responsibility.
> > It is just identity and the issue is what it
> > is identity between. This does seem to catch something of what we
> > actually do when we come across a real case, but that catching can be
> > done as well with just one identity and ? as here ? different ways of
> > comparing things. Creating a new kind of identity where none is needed
> > or used (except to confuse people) seems a bad idea.
>
> People seem to be confused by absolute identity. For example, in:
>
> (1) la superman du la klark kent
> (2) ti pixra la superman
> ------------------------------------
> (3) ti pixra la klark kent
>
> People say that (1) and (2) seem to be true, that the reasoning seems
> to be valid, and yet (3) appears to be false. Paradox!
>
> Some people try to get around the paradox with talk of intensional
> contexts and all sorts of contortions with (2) and (3).
>
> Recognition of relative identity allows us to see that (1) (absolute
identity)
> is false. What is true is a relative identity claim:
>
> (1') la superman mintu la klark kent lo ka prenu
>
> but this fact is not enough to conclude that {la superman} and {la
klark kent}
> are co-referential terms. (2) is still true and (3) is still false,
> and there is no
> paradox because (1') does not warrant intersubstitution of terms
like (1)
> with absolute identity does.
Well, that seems to work -- except for introducing two kinds of
identity where there is only one. What we actually do in this case is
something like tis "Well, they are the same being, but they look very
different, so a picture of one would not be a picture of the other."
(Pictures are new here and they take a different kind of intensional
object -- probably -- see the article you recommended).So we identify
the body and differentiate the look and it is the look that counts for
pictures. That is< "Superman" and "Clark Kent" are ambiguous, not "is
identical with".
>
> > > But then we have to be careful with the claim
> > > {la superman du la klark kent}. It is very often false. And if
we can
> > > see that that claim is false, there is no failure of substitution of
> > > co-referring terms since we don't have co-referring terms to begin
> > > with.
> >
> > I am not sure that it is ever false, but if it is true that it is,
then,
> > yes, the problem does not arise. So the trick is to know when it is
> > false and that would be handled logically by having different
> > referring expressions for referring to the various things that are now
> > all referred to by "Superman" and "Clark Kent."
>
> That would be great, but since all those things are potentially
infinite,
> it's impractical/impossible to have a different expression for each.
Well, I am not sure what is infinitie here, but notice we seem always
able to explain what is happening by identifying the things involved.
To be sure, we could not always do it, but when we need it we have
the devices to make the distinction. And many of the intereting cases
involve just a few intensional objects which we probably want to have
anyhow.
>
> > You have yet to show that *any* of the problems can be solved by
> > simple reference.
>
> The three "paradoxes" of intensional contexts are, succintly:
>
> (1) failure of intersubstitution of co-referential terms.
> (2) failure of existential commitment.
> (3) ambiguity between unspecific and specific readings.
>
> The solution to (1) is to recognize that what at first sight may
appear to be
> co-referential terms, are not really co-referential. Just because
two things
> are the same something does not mean that they are one thing. Just
because
> {la superman mintu la klark kent lo ka prenu} does not mean {la
superman du
> la klark kent}. So there is no failure of intersubstitution of
> co-referential terms
> because the terms in question are not co-referential to begin with.
That is, to recognize that many apparently referring expression are
systematically ambiguous and so the problem can be solved by pointing
to the right choice of meaning. For the intensional cases, this
amounts to being clear about sense and reference, which is what I have
been suggesting all along. Of course, the paradox can be resolved,
but the suggestion is to show the reolution instead of leaving it to
be worked out in each case. (There may, of course, be other
ambiguities that sometimes arise, but those are not the present
problem.) A solution, but one that does in no way rely on token-type,
which is what you are claiming works.
> The solution to (2) involves recognizing that commitment to having a
referent
> as a member of the domain of discourse in no way entails commitment to
> that referent existing in the world, which is the apparent paradoxical
> commitment.
It still doesn't work. Secondary occurrences do not add things to the
domain. There is no problem of the expression not referrin -- it
does, but not in the ongoing domain. No solution and no connection
with token-type.
> As for (3), yes, we have to admit that any reference is inherently
> vague. But it
> is important to realize that the ambiguity is not just between two
options but
> a whole tree of options, so a simple marker does not solve the
issue. {le}
> and {lo'e} can serve as pointers towards one or the other end of the
scale,
> to help in the context, but in the end they only serve as relative
markers,
> not absolute.
This does look like token-type in the talk of trees. I don't think
that expressions of the sort we are dealing with are vague; they are
ambiguous. There are several well-developed possible referents
(actually, that is a little misleading in some cases) and it is
sometimes unclear which is meant, but each of these meanings is
adequately precise. There is no evidence of trees being involved here
at all, nor do {lo'e} and{le} enter in (there are no sets involved --
or need not be) and by its very nature, {lo} does not fade into {le}.
> > If you mean by that that every expression in all
> > contexts refers to its referent, that is precisely the situation that
> > I am trying to get in Lojban.
>
> I'd say "in each context", not "in all contexts". I'm not sure how you
> mean the scope of "all contexts" to work there with respect to
> "its referents". The referent of an expression may vary from context
> to context.
That is, of course, the source of the problem and what I would like to
see eliminated -- at least in posse. I expect that at least some
cases will be casually left undifferentiated, for the context to
decide. But for some of the common ones, we can build in prevention
from the start -- especially those that lead to paradox.
> > For some expressions that referent will
> > be intensional (as it is for some expressions already), for other
> > extensional.
> >
> > By the way, it seems to me that the right thing to use for "qua" is a
> > modality (which I can't find, suggesting another screw up) for "by
> > standard." For the case of Clinton, something derived from {te xamgu}
> > seems to be just right.
>
> {ma'i}?
Maybe {sema'i} but I don't know just what may be involved in
association with {manri}. The second place of {xamgu} also looks
useful in the particular case.