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Nick:
> So lemee see if I got this
>
> And's Kind is, as it turns out, Jorge's Intensional article reborn
I think so, but I have extended it so that one can quantiy over
(sub)Kinds of a Kind, & I think that proved quite a crucial
extension both in helping us to model the things we say and in
allowing us a way to distinguish reals from imaginaries.
> Let there be a predicate broda(), with a denotation {x1, x2...}
>
> Let there be another predicate, brodo()
>
> If brodo(x) holds for at least one individual x:broda(x), then brodo
> holds of the Kind-of-broda
>
> Let me refer to these as Indiv(broda) and Kind(broda)
>
> Kind(broda) is not extensionally defined. If broda can be claimed of
> any entity x, then any relation that x enters into is a relation
> entered into by Kind(broda)
Pretty much.
> Kinds are related to individuals by avatars. Indiv(broda) =
> Avatar(Kind(broda))
Yes. I called 'avatar' 'instance' in 4ExSol. Note that 'individual'
here does not contrast with 'substance', which is why I used 'jbomass'
instead.
Can I try to put it in my terms? Here goes:
Start with a Concept of a thing, e.g. Laugh(ter). You can choose to
talk about it as a Kind by expressing it as a constant (Mr Laugh(ter)),
a sumti, something that in combo with a predicate yields a proposition.
Kind(Laugh) is all the laughter in all worlds. Or you can treat it
as a unary predicate -- something that in combo with a constant or
bound variable yields a proposition. Predicate(Laugh)(x) means that
x has properties that to some relevant degree match the properties that
define Laughter. Typically the properties of x would be a superset
of the properties that define Laughter, or at least the properties
of x would include most or enough of the properties that define
Laughter. Since one of the defining properties of laughter is that
it occurs in spacetime, if Predicate(Laugh)(x) then x is a bit of
a spacetime, one bit of laughter in one world.
4ExSol calls Kind(Laugh) 'Mr Laugh'. It calls Predicate(Laugh)
'is an instance of Mr Laugh'.
4ExSol also allows you quantify over everything that 'is a Kind of
Mr Laugh', which for clarity's sake I maybe should have called
'subkind'. If x is a subkind of Mr Laugh, then x is the Kind
corresponding to a concept defined by properties that are a
superset of the properties that define Laughter. So x might
be Mr Giggle, or x might be Mr Nick's-Guffawing-Twice-on-Sunday-
Afternoon-in-a-Melbourne-Dunny.
> If x1 is Indiv(broda) and x2 is a distinct Indiv(broda), they belong to
> an identical Kind
>
> So, if you kill Fred, you kill Mr Human1
> If you kill Bill, you kill Mr Human2
> Fred != Bill
> Mr Human1 == Mr Human2
Yes. You can also see it this way:
If you kill Fred, you kill Mr Fred.
If you kill Bill, you kill Mr Bill.
Fred !- Bill
Mr Fred != Mr Bill
Mr Fred is a subkind of Mr Human.
Mr Bill is a subkind of Mr Human.
therefore, if you kill Fred or if you kill Bill, you kill Mr Human.
> When we say that x is the same as y, we do not mean that x == y
> We mean that Kind(x) == Kind(y)
Strictly speaking, we mean that x and y are both Instances of
the same Kind. Or that Kind(x) and Kind(y) are both subkinds of
Kind(z).
> If we both ate chips, we did not eat the identically same individual.
> But we did eat the identically individual Kind
>
> In extensional contexts, if something is true of a Kind, it is always
> true of an avatar of the kind
> In intensional contexts, that equation is not the case
> I also think it is not the case in claims of identity vs. sameness
>
> The Kind is the de dicto version of the individual
>
> The Founders confusedly saw there was a need for this, and glommed the
> Kind (along with absolutely everything else) into the lojbanmass. So
> you can legitimately say {mi nitcu loi mikce} meaning you want the
> Kind(doctor), and expect an individual out, but an intensional
> individual. Jim Brown using Trobriander legends as an illustration of
> this was spectacularly something or other --- either ingenious or dumb.
> But Mr Shark, Shark Goo, and Two Sharks are not the same thing (let
> alone Two Scoops of Shark Goo, Mr Two Scoops of Shark Goo, Two Couples
> of Sharks, Two ShapeShifters Who Take Turns Being The Shark but aren't
> necessarily both the shark at any one time [the 'Duet' of sharkdom],
> and so on and so on.)
I'll take your word for it that part of the intention behind jbomass
was that it would do Kinds. But I don't think that SL {pisu'o loi
ro -detective} can give you Holmes. More generally, to the limited
extent that I can make sense of SL jbomass, I think it doesn't
cover Kinds. But of course that's partly because it's thanks to
John that to some extent I can make sense of jbomass, and John is
very sternly and primly extensionalist. (I called him Swiss the
other day, but today I'm thinking of him as a lowlands protestant
Scot.)
> So the lojbanmass ends up doing: substance, collective, kind. With no
> clear disambiguation between the three (let alone kinds of substance,
> kinds of collective, collectives of collectives, collectives of
> substances) until we opened this debate
>
> Jordan said "leave it to pragmatics" at the start, and this is *a* SL
> answer. To me, however, a design goal of Lojban is disambiguability. It
> is a non-negotiable goal for me
>
> I will endeavour to keep loi for as much of this as possible, to
> preserve consistency with SL -- i.e. the substance/collective
> conflation in loi. I think I see why the collective and the kind were
> conflated, and I may end up defending that too --- but it leaves a bad
> taste in my mouth
>
> In And's schemes, the Kind is syntactically prior. The avatar is
> derived from the Kind by explicit quantification
In 4ExSol, {lo broda} is Mr Broda, {Q lo broda} quantifies over
subkinds of Mr Broda, and {Q (loi) broda} quantifies over Instances
of Mr Broda. I don't think that in that picture you have to see
the Kind as syntactically prior.
Note that 4ExSol can be switched to say that {loi broda} is Mr
Broda, {Q loi broda} quantifies over subkinds of Mr Broda, and {Q (lo)
broda} quantifies over Instances of Mr Broda.
> In SL, the denotation of loi has always been an utter fuckup --- and
> one that I will never, never forgive. But that lo broda is
> extensionally defined, not intensionally, is one that I think is basic
> to Lojban.
So if (counterfactual) you were to accept 4XS in principle, you'd
presumably prefer lo for the extensionals and loi for the intensionals.
> When And brought up the equation "is lo broda == su'o da poi
> broda always", we got sidetracked into asking whether {da poi broda}
> can also be an uncountable substance.
Well, that was actually the reason why I asked the question!
> (It clearly can, and if we
> preserve the equation lo broda == su'o da poi broda, we would need to
> make the sea tu'o loi tu'o broda.)
Or, indifferently, {tu'o lo tu'o broda}.
> But the real question is, is the
> referent of {lo broda} always quantified by a prenex? Are all our
> claims of entities ultimately extensional?
John says Yes, for everything but nu.
> Propositionalism says yes, by supplying a nested prenex: the referent
> may not be quantified in this world, they reason, but they are
> quantified in some world. But imagining, depicting, and fearing don't
> work well with propositionalism. And when I look for a doctor, it's not
> really that there is at least one indvidual in my mental world that I
> want. The relationship is between me and doctor-kind, not between me
> and any one individual doctor in any possible world. Introducing
> unicorns, which don't exist in this world, only confuse the issue:
> there is plenty of de dicto/de re going on with existing entities
>
> I think we should allow intensional entities in. I am prepared to call
> them Kinds
>
> I recognise that English NPs are both intensional and extensional (a
> doctor is both de dicto and de re), and And is followed an honoured
> tradition in making the de dicto reading basic, and the de re derived
> by quantification
>
> I think the Lojban prescription (as addled as it has been) cannot
> survive {lo broda} being a Kind and {pa lo broda} being an Individual,
> or telling people that when there are two doctors you want you want {re
> lo mikce}, but when you want any two doctors you want {lo mikce remei}
Can it survive {loi broda} being a Kind and {(pa) lo broda} being an
Individual, or telling people that when there are two doctors you want
you want {re (lo) mikce} or {(pa) lo re mikce}, but when you want any
two doctors you want {loi re mikce}?
That's not consistent with the fundament, but I'm wondering whether
it's consistent with a very conservative brand of formalist revision
as favoured by the Nicolaity.
> Therefore, though I now see that making the Kind basic is ontologically
> sensible (after all, we start with the predicate and then stick gadri
> in front of it), and it follows the last three decades of semantic
> thought ---
>
> I still cannot accept it for Lojban. In any solution I propound, {lo
> broda} is the same as {su'o lo broda}, and the Kind is derived. Having
> people used marked expressions to speak of Kinds is a bother. But it's
> a bother they will welcome. People like about Lojban that it makes them
> see ambiguities they didn't see before. When Mark said "no, he's not
> looking for her, he's looking for x such that x is his mother",
> enlightenment was reached. (This is the gosling that looked for her
> mother when newly hatched --- "Are you my mother?" ko'a isn't x:x is
> her mother, which is intensional, but extensional. Confronted with
> ko'a, the gosling would have no idea whether ko'a was her mother or
> not. She'd have found ko'a extensionally (de re), but not x:x is her
> mother (de dicto.)
But what is perhaps the key idea behind 4XS is that for pure
extensionalism the lV/lVi distinction is redundant and that one
can serve for *pure* extensionalism and the other can serve for
*pure* intensionalism. 4XS does require you to redefine certain
elements of the SL gadri and quantifier system, but it doesn't
deprive you of pure extensionalism or, if it is your preference,
the use of {lo} to do so.
> When Mark said this at Lohgest, enlightenment was reached. It will not
> be reached by having over and covert quantification cover up the
> difference. If people don't learn what the difference is, they will
> still confuse it. It will be reached by marking the difference. To me,
> that means LAhE still
I don't see how a LAhE can yield an intensional if it is applied to
a gadri that is extensional. Instead, an intensional gadrow is needed.
I suppose SL could do it by adding kau or some other UI to the
extensional gadri.
--And.