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RE: [jboske] more true (was: ka ka (was: Context Leapers))



pc:
> xod@hidden.email writes:
> <<
> This means mapping a qualitative set upon the quantity scale, which is all
> "qualitative" really is: words and phrases standing for numbers or number
> ranges. To establish and vigorously defend a different cmavo for a
> distinction on the order of Roman numerals vs. Arabics seems ludicrous,
> particularly in the absence of a rigorous way to specify the
> quality:quantity map being used. (Hint: yes, I am referring to ni and ka.)
> >>
> Interesting claim, but so counter to obvious experience and common 
> sense (and the history of mankind) that it is going to need a lot 
> (booklength, at least, probably) of justification before anyone 
> should feel compelled to give it any heed or pay any attention to 
> claims based upon its truth.

Can we agree that there is a case for keeping ni-ness and jei-ness
distinct, and a case for collapsing them into one notion, and that
the most satisfactory approach is to have both options?

> <<
> In the context of fuzzy logic, tall=1 either means he is the tallest
> imaginable, or that nobody can dispute that he's tall. This really
> correlates to an infinite height. However, Kareem may certainly be beyond
> the "tall enough" limit. Big deal.
> >>
> Or that he is over some selected (for whatever reason) threshold -- 
> and one can surely find other ways to do this.  the infinite value 
> one is possible but not very useful and so rarely (if ever) used.
> 
> <<
> What is the distinction between "truth values" and "comments"?
> >>
> A truth value is the value the claim actually receives on evaluation, 
> a comment is a claim that such-and-such is the actual evaluation 
> (like most claims, these can be wrong -- in various degrees even if 
> our metalamguage is also multivalent).

I realize that I have been misunderstanding you (my fault, probably). 
I thought that by comment you meant "parenthetical comment, not part 
of what is actually claimed". 

Now that I understand what you meant, let me clarify that I think
the whole discussion (at least the contributions from me, xod and
Jorge) has been about "comments" -- functions from states-of-affairs 
that have a truth value to states-of-affairs that have a truth value, 
and NOT functions from states-of-affairs to a truth value (i.e. NOT 
like {jei}).

> <<
> I have a little problem with ja'a + CAI. It emulates the UI, where a ui
> covers .5 the truth scale and uinai covers the other. But it's the same
> ui; here with ja'a and na it's a different cmavo and no "-nai". To improve
> the emulation we should use "nanai" or "ja'anai" -- or better yet, just
> stick with the digits God gave us.
> >>
> Huh!?  {ui} -- and {uinai} -- have nothing to do with truth scales at 
> all, thay have to do with happiness scales, if that makes any sense, 
> and even then it is not clear that {ui} and {uinai} exhaust the 
> scale: what about {uiru'e} or {uicai} and especially {uicu'i}?
> And, obviously, {ja'a} and {na} are not a pair like {ui} and {uinai}, 
> but two entirely different critters: a connective and a comment.  
> {ko'a na broda} doesn't mean "{ko'a broda} is false," a 
> metalinguistic claim; it claims the complementary situation to that 
> claimed by {ko'a broda}  -- or however negation is defined in a given 
> system -- an object linguistic claim.  {ko'a ja'a broda}, on the 
> other hand, does make the metalinguistic claim that {ko'a broda} is true.

I'm confused again. 

{ko'a na broda} indeed doesn't mean {jitfa fa lu ko'a broda},
but it does mean {jitfa fa lo'e du'u ko'a broda}. So it is not
metalinguistic (or it is not 'metalinguistic' in the sense in
which I understand the term or in the sense implied by your
example "{ko'a broda} is false". (As to whether it counts as a 
"comment", I am confused.)

> <<
> And:
> I wonder if there will be ambiguous cases, when
> pi PA values are ambiguous between (a) how much p is happening,
> and (b) the extent to which p satisfies the threshold criteria
> for being true at all. For example, {ko'a ja'a xi pi bi melbi}
> might mean that ko'a's beauty measures .8 in millihelens, or
> it might mean that ko'a is not quite beautiful but is close to
> the threshold of beauty. I'd prefer to stick with the latter
> reading only.
> >>
> 
> I hope you don't mean that ja'axipibi melbi is less than melbi! I should
> think it means the le melbi is .8 on [0, 1] of melbi.
> >>
> That is indeed (I think) one of the things that And might mean here: 
> it is not beautiful short of 1.0 -- maybe with he possibility of 
> going on after, of course. This is, I gather, his b.  

Right.

--And.