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| In a message dated 10/5/2002 2:13:36 PM Central Daylight Time, a.rosta@hidden.email writes: << I think there are three degrees of truth: true, sort-of and false. >> I'm with you to the last sentence, then you throw it all away. There are only three truth values (say). If two claims have the same truth value, they have the same amount of truth, whatever that is (T, 0, F, say). One may have more of the quantified matter that makes for truth than another, but given both have enough to be true, then both are equally true. They are also, obviously, unequal in that quantitative aspect -- one has more of what makes for truth, but having made truth, it doesn't make more. (All of this is based on a very simple relation between quantitative aspects of an event and truth of propositions about events, and probably -- in thinking it through, anyhow -- has mixed together to some extent quantities in the event with quantities of the event. Thus, in much of the talk about "He is inside the room," much of what leads up to Truth as presented (implicitly at least) in terms of feet and inches from the door to some significant part of his body (nearest, farthest or specific part). These are quantities in the situation, but not off the situation, although almost certainly relevant to the latter, but maybe not decisively so (from another example, skinny people are tall shorter than fat people). And, of course, the quantity(ies) of the situation are likely relevant to the truth of the claim about it, but not necessarily decisive.) Of course, there are functions that will distinguish cases with different underlying factors "barely," "totally," and so on. << "ja'a cai" = "it's very very true that (he's moving)", which implies that he's moving a lot, or fast, or suchlike. It is not a robust way to assert that he is moving fast, but it's a convenient shorthand. >> Well, literally "strongly true," though what emotion truth is is unclear (but it passes the parser, so we can find a use for it somehwere). Now, maybe we have a slough (?slue?, slew?) of truth values, a half dozen or so, and this is a comment to the effect that "He's moving" is evaluated at a fairly hight member of the set: above "very true" but, perhaps, below "totally true." [Remember though that the comment may be wrong.] This means that he the conditions for perfect moving to a high degree (xorxes' style, I think) and/or the quantity of the event as a case of him moving is very high and/or some quantifiable physical features of the event which are significant for his moving have high values or the truth value ddepends on a bunch of other factors altogether. But, even if these more or less quantitative factors are significant, it may be that the high truth status comes from something else -- grace in motion, say, rather than speed in any of its several senses here (largely matching the various senses of "moving"). Now, if we are agreed on a particular set of connections among these various notions and those connections allow it, then we can infer back from a high truth value to certain levels in other factors. But I don't think that the relations implicit in the shorthand here are so obviously the natural ones that we can assume they are in use as defaults, whatever "moving fast" or "moving a lot" mean. |